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ESSAY
ANTITRUST’S UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICS
Daniel A. Crane*

INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law stands at its most fluid and negotiable moment in a
generation. The bipartisan consensus that antitrust should solely focus
on economic efficiency and consumer welfare has quite suddenly come
under attack from prominent voices calling for a dramatically enhanced
role for antitrust law in mediating a variety of social, economic, and
political friction points, including employment, wealth inequality, data
privacy and security, and democratic values. To the bewilderment of
many observers, the ascendant pressures for antitrust reforms are
flowing from both wings of the political spectrum, throwing into
confusion a conventional understanding that pro-antitrust sentiment
tacked left and antitrust laissez faire tacked right.
On the left, the assault on the consumer-welfare-oriented status quo
has migrated from reformist organizations like the Open Markets
Institute1 and anti-corporate progressives like senator Elizabeth Warren
and the House Democratic Leadership, which has staked the 2018 mid* Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

1 Open Markets, https://perma.cc/G35H-LAFH (last visited Aug 23, 2018). Open Markets
was affiliated with the left-leaning New America Foundation, until forced out over Open
Markets’s criticisms of Google, a New America patron. Kenneth P. Vogel, Google Critic
Ousted from Think Tank Funded by the Tech Giant, N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidt-google-new-america.html.
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term elections on an economic platform including antitrust reform as a
centerpiece.2 In the Democratic Party’s center, the formation of a House
Antitrust Caucus3 and reform bills introduced in both the House4 and the
Senate5 underscore increasing political traction to jettison the consumerwelfare status quo. The Democrats’ “Better Deal” plan asserts that
consumers are but one of the classes that antitrust should protect, with
workers, suppliers, and small business taking an equal place in the
protected class.6 Significantly, the document launches harsh criticisms of
the past thirty years of antitrust enforcement as excessively lax—a
period over which Democrats ran antitrust enforcement just over half of
the time.7 The Democratic leadership has made clear that it does not
intend to exclude the Clinton and Obama administrations from its
criticism, and that it intends to advocate a major trans-partisan
rethinking of antitrust policy.8
On the right, President Trump has attacked concentrated economic
power in technology and big media,9 and his Justice Department
launched a surprising, aggressive challenge to the AT&T–Time Warner
vertical merger (the district court rejected the Administration’s challenge
to the merger on substantive antitrust grounds and the case is now on

2
U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Leadership, A Better Deal: Crack Down on
Corporate Monopolies & the Abuse of Economic and Political Power, https://perma.cc/25G
M-QFJX.
3
Tess Townsend, Keith Ellison and the New ‘Antitrust Caucus’ Want to Know Exactly
How Bad Mergers Have Been for the American Public, N.Y. Mag. (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://perma.cc/JE3W-THHS.
4
21st Century Competition Commission Act of 2017, H.R. 4686, 115th Cong. (2017),
https://perma.cc/JE3W-THHS; Merger Retrospective Act of 2017, H.R. 4538, 115th Cong.
(2017), https://perma.cc/6CW7-QNCC.
5
Merger Enforcement Improvement Act, S. 1811, 115th Cong. (2017), https://perma.cc/
H9XS-GSUH.
6
U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Leadership, supra note 2.
7
Id.
8
Chuck Schumer, A Better Deal for American Workers, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/chuck-schumer-employment-democrats.html
(“Democrats have too often hesitated from taking on those misguided policies directly and
unflinchingly — so much so that many Americans don’t know what we stand for.”).
9
Trump Says Amazon has ‘a huge antitrust problem,’ CNBC (May 13, 2016),
https://perma.cc/2SYD-W6HF; Trump’s comments create a lose-lose position for Justice,
Wash. Post (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-commentscreate-a-lose-lose-position-for-justice/2017/11/13/6fd7b28e-c596-11e7-aae0cb18a8c29c65_story.html?utm_term=.3fa9eb549b54.
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appeal).10 Trump’s trustbusting might be dismissed as a feature of his
idiosyncratic populism or, less charitably, abusive vendettas against
corporate political foes like CNN and Amazon, but the reformist
sentiment on the right is far from limited to the President. Similar
sentiments have been expressed by diverse conservative figures such as
activist Steve Bannon, who wants to turn Google and Facebook into
public utilities,11 conservative economist Kenneth Rogoff,12 and
Trump’s decided political foe Bill Kristol, who criticizes Robert Bork’s
consumer-welfare standard and proposed a significant reinvigoration of
the antitrust laws to limit the growing power of tech’s Big Five
(Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft).13 The American
Conservative recently turned with surprising ferocity on that
conservative icon Bork, asserting that “[w]hereas prior generations of
lawmakers protected the American citizenry as businessmen,
entrepreneurs, and growers, Bork led a revolution that sacrificed the
small producer at the altar of efficiency and cheap goods.”14
Standing against the anti-incumbent challengers from both political
wings is a broad, bi-partisan establishment center seeking to defend the
consumer-welfare framework. Until recently, this establishment center
seemed far from unified. Since the rise of the Chicago School in the
1970s, antitrust law has been contested on terms that seemed generally
to track left–right political ideology, with those on the left favoring more
aggressive intervention and those on the right more laissez faire.15 But
the rising tide of calls for a radically different version of antitrust has led
to a circling of establishment wagons around the consumer-welfare
standard. Left-leaning organizations that once led the charge for more
aggressive enforcement now find themselves defending the consumerwelfare idea in principle, even while calling for more aggressive

10
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal docketed, No.
18-5214 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018).
11
Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to Do to Google, The Atlantic (Aug. 1,
2017), https://perma.cc/ZL8L-7URB.
12
John Kehoe, Kenneth Rogoff Concerned by the Dark Side of the Technology
Revolution, Fin. Rev. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/94G5-HY8W.
13
The New Center, Ideas to Re-Center America 10–17, https://perma.cc/L9H6-6QY2.
14
Daniel Kishi, Robert Bork’s America, The Am. Conservative (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://perma.cc/KD9E-YLGT.
15
See generally How The Chicago School Overshot the Mark: the Effect of Conservative
Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (presenting arguments,
generally from “the left,” against reigning Chicago School orthodoxy).
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enforcement within that paradigm.16 Meanwhile, conventionally
conservative or pro-business leaning organizations continue to defend
the consumer-welfare standard against assaults from their own right
flank.17
This Essay shows that, although unconventional in presentist terms,
the emerging political dislocations over antitrust policy reflect
longstanding ideological ambiguities about and within the antimonopoly
tradition. In particular, the current political fracturing over antitrust is
best understood by examining three ideological friction points that have
emerged periodically within American history: (1) the ideological
ambiguity surrounding the association between large scale in business
and large scale in government; (2) the shifting meaning of “monopoly”
from the exclusive grant of government privilege to purely private
power, and a related question about the sources of monopoly power; and
(3) pragmatic concerns about the ability of the capitalist order to survive
without regulatory interventions to smooth its roughest edges. Taken in
the context of these longstanding friction points, the strange-bedfellow
coalitions uneasily rising around contemporary antitrust reform aren’t
that strange at all.
I. THE IDEOLOGICAL AMBIGUITY OF LARGE SCALE IN GOVERNMENT AND
BUSINESS
A. Brandeis and Bork as Ideological Touchpoints
Although American antitrust policy has been influenced by a wide
variety of ideological schools, two influences stand out as historically
18

16
See Danny Vinik, Inside the New Battle Against Google, Politico (Sept. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/G9JV-77WL (reporting on resistance to Open Markets’ assault on the
consumer-welfare standard by traditionally left-leaning, pro-enforcement groups like
American Antitrust Institute and New America Foundation).
17
See, e.g.¸ Federalist Soc’y Regulatory Transparency Project, Antitrust & Consumer
Protection Working Group, https://perma.cc/JSM3-2NYB (defending the consumer-welfare
standard); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Competition Policy & Antitrust, https://perma.cc/
52L2-6ZHV (“Antitrust remedies should enhance consumer welfare and make sense in an
interconnected world.”).
18
See generally Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Making of Competition
Policy: Legal and Economic Sources (2013) (summarizing the intellectual influences that
have shaped competition policy).
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most significant to understanding the contemporary antitrust debate. The
first is a Brandeisian school, epitomized in the title of Louis Brandeis’
1914 essay (subsequently made the title of a 1934 collection of his
essays) in Harper’s Weekly: A Curse of Bigness. Arguing for
“regulated competition” over “regulated monopoly,” Brandeis asserted
that it was necessary to “curb[] physically the strong, to protect those
physically weaker” in order to sustain industrial liberty. Brandeis
evoked a Jeffersonian vision of a social-economic order organized on a
small scale, with atomistic competition between a large number of
equally advantaged units. In particular, he criticized industrial
consolidation on economic, social, and political grounds. As explained
in a dissenting opinion by William O. Douglas in the 1948 case of
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., Brandeis worried that “size can
become a menace—both industrial and social. It can be
an industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities against
existing or putative competitors. It can be a social menace—because of
its control of prices.”
The Brandeisian vision held sway in U.S. antitrust law from the
Progressive Era through the early 1970s, albeit with significant
interruptions. Its spirit animates a long chain of important cases from
Chicago Board of Trade in 1918 (authored by Brandeis himself) to
Topco in 1972, and a string of Congressional reforms including the
Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts of 1914, the Robinson–
Patman Act of 1938, and the Celler–Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950.
19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

29

Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, Harper’s Wkly., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18.
Louis D. Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition? (1934), reprinted in
Crane & Hovenkamp, supra note 18 at 185. On Brandeis’ influence in antitrust, see generally
Kenneth G. Elzinga & Micah Webber, Louis Brandeis and Contemporary Antitrust
Enforcement, 33 Touro L. Rev. 277 (2017).
21
See Jeffrey Rosen, The Curse of Bigness, The Atl. (June 3, 2016),
https://perma.cc/6QQG-GQS5 (summarizing Brandeis’ vision).
22
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535–36 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
23
See, e.g., Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in
Economic Ambivalence 3–16 (1995) (detailing the place of Brandeisian School among
prevailing New Deal ideologies).
24
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
25
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
26
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012).
27
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
28
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012).
20
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The ascendant Chicago School of the 1960s and 70s threw down the
gauntlet to the Brandeisian tendency of U.S. antitrust law. In an early
mission statement, Robert Bork and Ward Bowman characterized
antitrust history as “vacillat[ing] between the policy of preserving
competition and the policy of preserving competitors from their more
energetic and efficient rivals,” the latter being an interpretation of the
Brandeis School. Richard Posner struck a similar note in his 1976 book
on antitrust, asserting that “the proper purpose of the antitrust laws is to
promote competition, as that term is understood in economics.”
Chicagoans argued that antitrust law should be concerned solely with
economic efficiency and consumer welfare (more on these values in a
moment). “Bigness” was no longer necessarily a curse, but often the
product of superior efficiency. Chicago criticized Brandeis’ “sympathy
for small, perhaps inefficient, traders who might go under in fully
competitive markets.” Preserving a level playing field meant stifling
efficiency to enable market participation by the mediocre.
Beginning in 1977–78, the Chicago School achieved an almost
complete triumph in the Supreme Court, at least in the limited sense that
the Court came to adopt the economic efficiency/consumer welfare
model as the exclusive or near-exclusive goal of antitrust law. (Adoption
of Chicago School interpretations of consumer welfare and policy
positions on particular competitive practices would occur neither
immediately nor completely.) In 1979, citing Bork, the Court declared
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare
30

31

32

33

34

35

29

Act of December 29, 1950 (Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act), 64 Stat. 1125–26, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
30
Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363,
363–64 (1965).
31
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective ix (1976).
32
Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 9 (1978).
33
Id. at 41.
34
Id. at 137 (“Any firm that operates excludes rivals from some share of the market.
Superior efficiency forecloses. Indeed, exclusion or foreclosure is the mechanism by which
competition confers its benefits upon society. The more efficient exclude the less efficient
from the control of resources, and they do so only to the degree that their efficiency is
superior.”). Years later, as a paid consultant for Netscape against Microsoft, Bork employed
the level-playing-field metaphor affirmatively, asserting, “The object is to create a level
playing field benefiting consumers. That is what antitrust is about . . . .” Robert H.
Bork, What Antitrust Is All About, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1998, at A19.
35
See Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1911, 1922 (2009).
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prescription.’” Over time, the maxim that antitrust law should protect
“competition rather than competitors” became canonical. Brandeis had
been displaced by Bork.
If the last three or four decades of U.S. antitrust policy have largely
belonged to Bork—at least at an ideological level—the Bork-versusBrandeis dichotomy is far from settled. The voices at the cutting edge of
the rising reformist movement—particularly those aligned with the
influential Open Markets Institute—explicitly style themselves as a
“New Brandeis” school in order to re-up the historic contest between the
Brandeisian and Chicago School orders.
36

37

38

II. THE LINGERING SHADOWS OF JEFFERSONIANISM AND
HAMILTONIANISM
Although it is conventional to understand Brandeis’s anti-bigness
ideology as an aspect of Progressivism standing in contrast to Chicago’s
big-business conservatism, the story is historically more nuanced.
Brandeis’s preoccupation with “bigness” was not limited to large
corporate scale. He was also deeply concerned with large governmental
scale generally, and a large-scale federal government in particular. As
Jeffrey Rosen has observed, “Denouncing big banks as well as big
government as symptoms of what he called a ‘curse of bigness,’
Brandeis was determined to diminish concentrated financial and federal
power, which he viewed as a menace to liberty and democracy.”
Brandeis styled himself a Jeffersonian, and his ideology resonated with
the Jeffersonian preference for small-scale yeomanry and localized
political organization.
39

40

36

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing Bork, The Antitrust Paradox,
supra note 32 at 66).
37
E.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225
(1993) (“It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition,
not competitors.’”) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
38
David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash Monopolies, The Nation (April
4, 2017), https://perma.cc/7ZMB-XHVM; Vinik, supra note 16; see also Matt Stoller
(@matthewstoller), Twitter (Jul. 9, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://perma.cc/P22E-U2EY (showing
a leading member of Open Markets self-identifying the organization as “neo-Brandeis”).
39
Rosen, supra note 21; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Louis D. Brandeis: American Prophet 1
(2016) (discussing Brandeis’ concern with big corporations and centralization of government
power under the New Deal).
40
Alfred Lief, Brandeis: The Personal History of an American Ideal 478 (1936).
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In lionizing large corporate scale, the Chicago School aligned itself
with the Hamiltonian vision for a robustly mercantile society grounded
on powerful financial and economic institutions. By doing so, Chicago
always risked alienating the libertarian right, with its affinity for
Jefferson’s vision for small-scale government and industrial production.
Many libertarians have found it hard to attack bloated government
without also worrying about bloated business (witness the rise of the Tea
Party, which arose in large part as a reaction to corporate bailouts).
Influential libertarians like Friedrich Hayek saw a role for antitrust law
in curbing monopolistic abuses because they understand unfettered
corporate power as a threat to personal liberty.
The divide between the competing Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
ideals on organizational scale and their implications for efficiency and
liberty thread through antitrust’s intellectual and ideological history,
often disrupting conventional political alignments. Teddy Roosevelt, a
deep admirer of Hamilton, was comfortable with large scale in both
government and business. Far from a “trustbuster,” Roosevelt opposed
breaking up Standard Oil, viewing large aggregations of capital as
inevitable and necessary—so long as superintended by a strong federal
government. Roosevelt’s affinity for large-scale government and
business earned him the epithet of “socialist.” That charge was
hyperbolic, but not directionally implausible. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, American socialists looked with suspicion on
the antitrust laws because they viewed the rise of the Gilded Age trusts
as salutary stepping stones to government appropriation of the means of
production and industry. Socialist Presidential candidate Eugene Debs,
himself the defendant in an antitrust prosecution, argued: “Monopoly is
certain and sure. It is merely a question of whether we will be
collectively owned monopolies, for the good of the race, or whether they
41

42

43

44

45

41
Rosen, Louis D. Brandeis: American Prophet, supra note 39, at 10–14; see also Albert
Joy Nock, Jefferson (1983).
42
Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the Crucible of United States
v. Microsoft, 1 N.Y.U. J. Law & Liberty 167, 174–80 (2005).
43
See Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur B. Farquhar (Aug. 11, 1911), in
Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches 652 (Louis Auchincloss ed., 2004).
44
Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916, at
344–46 (1988).
45
See generally Henry Rand Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 4
(1899) (reporting that some socialists favored consolidation as a means to nationalization).
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will be privately owned for the power, pleasure and glory of the
Morgans, Rockefellers, Guggenheims, and Carnegies.”
Conversely, influential conservatives in antitrust’s formative era
favored aggressive antitrust enforcement as an antidote to the
simultaneous aggrandizement of government and business. In the
crucible election of 1912, William Howard Taft argued against
Progressive proposals to create a new Federal Trade Commission,
asserting that his administration’s aggressive enforcement record
demonstrated how traditional prosecutorial and common-law processes
could obviate the need to create new large governmental organizations
to combat big business. Taft’s pro-enforcement saber rattling reached
such a crescendo that Wall Street began to wonder whether Roosevelt
might be the candidate more sympathetic to their interests.
The New Deal, too, saw the Democratic Party equivocate between
contending Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian impulses on the question of
governmental and business scale. The first New Deal period—from
1933 to early 1935—was dominated by the National Industrial Recovery
Act (“NIRA”), which encouraged a centralization of both governmental
and industrial power. Brandeis led the charge on the Supreme Court to
strike down the NIRA in 1935, warning the White House that the Court
would not tolerate continued centralization of business or governmental
power. From 1935 until the beginning of World War II, the New Deal
administration followed a policy of aggressively Brandeisian antitrust
enforcement. Then, facing a need to mobilize big business for the war
effort, the administration abruptly shifted course and embraced a model
of partnership between big government and big business.
46

47

48

49

50

51

52

46

Eugene V. Debs, A Study of Competition, Appeal to Reason, May 28, 1910, at 2,
reprinted in Brett Flehinger, The 1912 Election and the Power of Progressivism 163 (2003).
47
Daniel Crane, Progressivism and the 1912 Election, in Crane & Hovenkamp, supra note
18, at 104–05.
48
Id. at 106.
49
Hawley, supra note 23, at 43–46.
50
Shortly before voting to strike down the NIRA in the Schechter Poultry and Panama
Refining decisions, Brandeis conveyed the following message to the White House: “This is
the end of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the President
that we’re not going to let this government centralize everything. It’s come to an end.” Peter
H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 104 (1982).
51
Hawley, supra note 23, at 360.
52
Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile, Antitrust in Wartime, Antitrust, Spring 2002, at
72–73 (reporting the government’s suspension of major antitrust prosecutions during World
War II).
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After the war, the perception that industrial concentration in Germany
and Japan had fueled the rise of fascism contributed to a two-decade
period of intensive antitrust enforcement—particularly against
mergers—launched by the Celler–Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950.
Here again, the ideology of the antimonopoly movement was ambiguous
in conventional left–right terms. The antimonopolist Senator Kefauver
warned that the consequence of further industrial concentration would
be government takeover, and that could lead either to fascism, on the
one hand, or socialism or communism, on the other. Other proponents
of the act argued that the antitrust laws were “one of the greatest
bulwarks against Communism,” and that the rising tide of industrial
concentration was driving the country toward “collectivism.” It is no
coincidence that the most anti-consolidationist statute in American
history was passed during the period of the Red Scare.
The ambiguity in the relationship between corporate scale and
governmental scale has translated into a historical ambiguity in the
politics of antitrust enforcement. Just as the two major contemporary
political parties each blend contradictory Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
elements, so too antitrust ideology has not neatly tracked left–right
dichotomies. On a statistical basis, civil antitrust enforcement by the
government peaked during the conservative Nixon and Ford
administrations. The Chicago School rode the wave of Ronald Reagan’s
decoupling of the curse of bigness; bigness was a curse in the
government only, not in business. But Chicago’s decoupling of the
ideological aversion to large scale in government and business is not
inevitable and may be, in historical perspective, anomalous. As historian
Richard Hofstadter has written, American feelings about large
organizational units in government and business have generally tracked
in parallel: “From [America’s] colonial beginnings through most of the
nineteenth century . . . Americans came to take it for granted that
property would be widely diffused, that economic and political power
would be decentralized.” The gradual public acceptance of the rise of
53

54

55

56

57

53
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1053–54
(1979).
54
96 Cong. Rec. 16,452 (1950) (statement of Sen. Kefauver).
55
Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1, 25 (1982) (quoting House and Senate debates).
56
Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement 36–37 (2011).
57
Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement (1964), reprinted in
Crane & Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 227.
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big business in the twentieth century is attributable in part “to the
emergence of countervailing bigness in government and labor.”
Historically, it is no anomaly that small-government conservatives
would find common ground with Brandeisian progressives in resenting
the growth and power of large-scale industrial firms, which are not so
easily distinguished from large-scale governmental agencies.
58

II. THE SHIFTING MEANING OF “MONOPOLY” AND CONTESTATION OVER
ITS SOURCES
A. What Is a “Monopoly?”
The ideological valence of the antimonopoly principle is ambiguous
in contemporary left–right terms, owing in large part to a historical shift
in the meaning of the word “monopoly,” particularly in its popular and
pejorative senses. Is a monopolist a private firm that corners a market
through nefarious, shrewd tactics? If so, the law’s antimonopoly
response codes “regulatory” and “interventionist” in left–right terms. Or
is a “monopoly” a cronyist intervention by the state to prevent freemarket competition? In that case, the antimonopoly principle codes as
“deregulatory” and “free market.” Both of these senses of “monopoly”
have been used historically, and their contemporary manifestations
remain tangled.
The first sense of “monopoly”—of purely private market power—has
a long-standing historical resonance. Legal regulation of private
monopoly and unfair competition reportedly extends back as far as the
Code of Hammurabi. A primordial antitrust case against grain dealers
appears in fourth-century B.C. Athens. One finds an antimonopoly
sentiment expressed in ninth-century B.C. Chinese thought, on the
ground that monopolies increase prices to consumers. A similar
sentiment appears in early Islamic law and in a fifth-century decree of
59

60

61

62

58

Id. at 238.
Fritz Machlup, The Political Economy of Monopoly: Business, Labor and Government
Policies 185 (1952).
60
Lambros E. Kotsiris, An Antitrust Case in Ancient Greek Law, 22 Int’l Law. 451, 454–
55 (1988).
61
2 Chen Huan-Chang, The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School 535
(1911).
62
Arvie Johan, Monopoly Prohibition According to Islamic Law: A Law and Economics
Approach, 27 Mimbar Hukum 166, 167 (2015), https://perma.cc/24W9-V2BX (“Whoever
withholds food (in order to raise its price), has certainly erred.” (citation omitted)).
59
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the Byzantine Emperor Zeno and the Justinian Code. A generally
moralist antimonopoly strand runs through the Christian tradition from
the medieval scholastics to the Protestant reformers. The earliest
common-law cases vitiating private monopolies date from the fourteenth
century.
On the other hand, constitutional historians recognize a long-standing
antimonopoly tradition—defined by such attributes as prohibitions on
governmental cronyism and special grants of economic privilege—in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Debates over corporate chartering and
monopoly pervaded the Founding era and continued through the
Jacksonian period and into the corporate liberalizations of the late
nineteenth century. Antimonopoly themes played an important role in
many of the landmark cases of U.S. constitutional law on such matters
as the limits of federal power, states’ impairment of contract
obligations, and the reach of the Reconstruction Amendments. Indeed,
the constitutional-democratic sense of the antimonopoly tradition
predates the American political order, with deep roots in the British
common law. Sir Edward Coke argued that all monopolies were against
the Magna Carta because they stood against liberty and freedom, and
the well-known British Case of Monopolies asserted parliamentary
jurisdiction over the grant of monopolies.
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Throughout much of the Anglo-American antimonopoly tradition,
“monopoly” primarily denoted a governmental grant of an exclusive
privilege—a “letter patent” in the sense of the classic common-law case:
The Case of Monopolies. Until the late nineteenth century, the
American antimonopoly tradition was concerned primarily with
governmental cronyism and exclusive privilege. As late as 1878,
Thomas Cooley devoted the thrust of his essay on limits to state control
of private business to the problem of state-granted monopoly, turning
only in the last few pages to the subsidiary problem of “monopolies not
created by the legislature.”
Over time, however, the primary legal meaning of “monopoly” has
shifted from the government-granted to the purely private. This shift
became apparent in U.S. antitrust law in 1943, when, in Parker v.
Brown, the Supreme Court held the Sherman Act inapplicable to
anticompetitive structures created by state regulation. Parker grew out
of the Supreme Court’s post-1937 constitutional jurisprudence rejecting
Lochner-era judicial scrutiny of regulatory schemes impairing property
or contract rights. Just as the post-1937 constitutional dispensation
avoided second-guessing state regulatory judgments in favor of
judicially preferred economic theories, so too the courts rejected efforts
to use the Sherman Act to the same effect (to the dismay of
conservatives, who favored the judiciary as a bulwark against over
regulation).
From one perspective, Parker turned the meaning of “monopoly” on
its head. Whereas, the primary meaning of “monopoly” in the AngloAmerican tradition had been a governmental grant of exclusive
73
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317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).
76
Daniel A. Crane & Adam Hester, State-Action Immunity and Section 5 of the FTC Act,
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Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 113, 125 (“What happens [under Parker] is that this legal regime
marks a complete inversion of the proper approach. State-sponsored cartels in the aftermath
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privilege—an interference with the natural rights of other market
participants—that primary sense of “monopoly” was now to be excluded
altogether from the Sherman Act’s antimonopoly legal regime. Only
purely private monopolies—the second sense of the word discussed
above—would be covered by antitrust.
The Parker doctrine of state-action immunity from antitrust has not
developed to immunize state regulation from Sherman Act preemption
as strongly as Parker’s language would suggest, and the doctrine’s
evolution continues. In the push-and-pull over the doctrine’s
boundaries, advocates of the Chicago School’s consumer-welfare
approach have been the principal proponents of narrowing state-action
immunity on the view that states systematically distort competitive
processes for the benefit of rent-seekers. This simultaneously proantitrust and deregulatory perspective tracks that strand of the
antimonopoly tradition that blames the government for various
problems.
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This ambiguity over the meaning of “monopoly” and its attendant
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governmental favoritism are the only important sources of durable
monopoly power, then one potential policy response is not to worry
about privately acquired monopoly—essentially, to turn the Parker
state-action immunity regime on its head and police only state-granted
monopolies. But there is another possibility flowing from the opening
premise, which is to hold that any observed instances of genuinely
durable monopoly power must be owing to some seen or unseen
governmental distortion. In this latter view, when what at first blush
seems to be purely private monopoly power persists over time, there
must be some underlying governmental distortion accounting for it.
Then, even committed libertarians should favor antitrust intervention to
terminate the monopoly.
This view is not hypothetical; it explains some of the right’s historical
affinity for antitrust enforcement despite the right’s otherwise laissezfaire predilections. The clearest case in point is the 1982 consent decree
breaking up AT&T.81 How did the largest antimonopoly corporate
break-up in history occur at the hands of the Reagan Administration and
its decidedly Chicago School Justice Department? The answer lies in
Assistant Attorney General Bill Baxter’s conviction that AT&T was
exploiting its status as a regulated monopolist to stifle competition.82
What has come to be known as “Baxter’s law” posits that rate-regulated
monopolists may extract monopoly profits from vertically integrated
markets without running afoul of the “one monopoly profit” theorem.83
Suspecting government regulation as the deep source of AT&T’s
Legal Limits of a Government’s Helping Hand, 2 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 165, 180 (1983)
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Rev. 187, 202–03 (1984) (examining the neoclassical view that only monopolies created by
law are durable).
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see generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397, 403 (2009) (“The single monopoly profit
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Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 Va. L. Rev. 123, 138–39
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Law).
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persistent monopolistic behavior, the conservative Reagan
Administration was willing to break it up.
Similar suspicions that Big Tech companies, like Google and
Facebook, are the monopolistic beneficiaries of subtle governmental
cronyism show up today on the political right.84 That Big Tech tends to
be associated politically with the Democratic Party only furthers these
perceptions.85 Those inherently suspicious of governmental
interventions in markets may understand Big Tech as the unnatural
spawn of governmentally granted privilege and private greed.
Conversely, those more sympathetic to governmental intervention may
find nothing alarming about the multiple ways in which Big Tech
appropriates governmental benefits through such vehicles as intellectualproperty law, government subsidies, or the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. But these matters divide the left as well. The Open
Markets Institute was forced out of the progressive-leaning New
America Foundation over Open Markets’ criticisms of Google.86 In light
of the contestable boundaries of the public–private divide and the
shifting meaning of monopoly, it is not surprising to see political
alliances fraying over antitrust reform.
III. PRAGMATIC CONCERNS OVER ANTITRUST’S ALTERNATIVES AND
CAPITALISM’S SURVIVAL
A final reason that the politics of antitrust sometimes confound
conventional left–right divides has to do with the pragmatic sense that
some regulatory interventions may be necessary to preserve capitalism
politically, and that antitrust may be the least objectionable one. This
“antitrust or else” perspective has characterized the politics of antitrust
from the beginning.
The conventional view that Congress intended the Sherman Act to
seriously undermine the trusts is balderdash. According to Professor
84
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Some Republicans Giving It to Them?, Red State (July 8, 2015, 10:13 AM), https://perma.cc
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The Intercept (July 27, 2017, 12:31 PM), https://perma.cc/TB99-MEB7; Farhad Manjoo,
Silicon Valley’s Politics: Liberal, With One Big Exception, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/silicon-valley-politics.html.
86
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Merle Fainsod and Lincoln Gordon of Harvard University, “[T]he
Republican Party, in control of the 51st Congress, was ‘itself dominated
at the time by many of the very industrial magnates most vulnerable to
real antitrust legislation.’”87 A more realistic view is that the 51st
Congress passed the Sherman Act to avert more radical reforms.
Speaking on the Senate floor in 1890, Senator John Sherman warned his
brethren, many of whom were controlled by the trusts, that Congress
“must heed [the public’s] appeal or be ready for the socialist, the
communist, and the nihilist.”88 Sherman thus conceived of his
eponymous antitrust statute as politically necessary to diffuse more
radical political movements—as a sort of Band-Aid on capitalism.
The idea that antitrust legislation and enforcement are necessary
accommodations to public demand has a long pedigree in both
conservative and more progressive circles. Writing in 1914, William
Howard Taft described the Sherman Act as “a step taken by Congress to
meet what the public had found to be a growing and intolerable evil.”89
Notably, Taft did not own the public’s concern himself, nor did he
attribute such a concern to Congress. Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt was
relatively unconcerned with the trusts personally, but he “saw the trust
problem as something that must be dealt with on the political level;
public concern about it was too urgent to be ignored.”90
Beyond the concern that, absent antitrust, capitalism itself might
succumb to reformist pressures, there is a more modest possibility that,
absent antitrust, political pressures would lead to overregulation.
Antitrust and administrative regulation are conventionally viewed as
alternatives to address market failures. From the Reagan Administration
to the Financial Crisis of 2008, the overall arc of American law involved
simultaneous deregulation and relaxation of antitrust enforcement. If
popular dissatisfaction with the economic status quo grows, demand
might grow to pull either the regulatory or antitrust lever. Those
ideologically committed to a light governmental hand on the market
might prefer the antitrust alternative.
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It is hard to judge at any given moment how much political support
for antitrust intervention is motivated by genuine concern over
monopoly and competition, and how much of it derives from the fact
that, in the face of popular demand for a governmental cure to a
perceived evil, it is often easier to delegate the solution to antitrust than
to propose a regulatory solution. From the Sherman Act forward,
however, it is certain that antitrust has often been deployed as a foil to
more interventionist forms of regulation. The ideological and political
implications of that move are complex and not neatly housed in left–
right categories.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust is back on the menu. Given the ebb-and-flow patterns of
antitrust enforcement in American history, that should come as no
surprise. Nor should it be surprising that the pressures for enhanced
antitrust enforcement are coming from both wings of the political
spectrum, as is the defense of the incumbent consumer welfare regime.
Despite the appearance of a conventional left–right divide over antitrust
enforcement since the 1970s, in broader historical perspective the
ideological lines over monopoly and competition are far less determined.

